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SEARCH AND SEIZURE

-

FOURTH AMENDMENT -

THE INCLUSION OF

MOTOR HOMES WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WARRANT REQUIREMENT

On May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Administration Agent
Robert Williams observed Charles Carney approach a youth in
downtown San Diego.' A few minutes later, Carney and the youth
walked to a nearby public parking lot and entered a Dodge Mini
Motor Home parked there. 2 Williams had received uncorroborated
information that the motor home was being used by a person
exchanging marijuana for sex. 3 On the basis of this information,
Williams requested the assistance of additional officers and began
surveillance of the motor home. 4 When the youth left the motor
home approximately seventy-five minutes later, the agents stopped
and questioned him.' The youth told the officers that Carney had
given him marijuana in exchange for sexual favors. 6 At the officers'
request, the youth returned to the motor home and asked Carney to
step outside. 7 After identifying themselves as law enforcement
officers, one of the agents immediately stepped into the motor home
1. California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2067 (1985), rev'g 34 Cal. 3d 597, 668 P.2d 807, 194
Cal. Rptr. 500 (1983).
2. People v. Carney, 117 Cal. App. 3d 36, __,
172 Cal. Rptr. 430, 432 (1981), rev'd, 34 Cal.
3d 597, 668 P.2d 807, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985). Shortly after Carney
and the youth entered the motor home, Carney closed its curtains, including a curtain across the
front windshield, thus shielding all view from the outside. Id.
3. 105 S. Ct. at 2067. An organization called WeTip ("We Turn in Pushers") furnished the
information that drugs were being dispensed from this particular motor home in exchange for sex.
117 Cal. App. 3d at __
, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 432 & n.2. The organization enables individuals to call
and anonymously provide information about drug dealers. Id. WeTip then relays this information to
nearby law enforcement personnel. Id.
4. See 105 S. Ct. at 2067. Williams, with the assistance of the other agents, kept the motor home
under surveillance the entire time the youth was inside. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. The boy told the officers that the occupant of the motor home had given him marijuana in
exchange for allowing the man to perform oral copulation on him. People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3o
597, 602, 668 P.2d 807, 809, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500, 502 (1983), rev'g .117 Cal. App. 3d 36, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 430 (1981), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
7. 34 Cal. 3d at 602, 668 P.2d at 809, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 502. When Carney stepped out of the
motor home, the agents identified themselves as law enforcement officers. 105 S. Ct. 2067.
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and observed marijuana, plastic bags, and "a scale of the kind used
in weighing drugs." 8 Agent Williams then arrested Carney and
impounded his motor home. 9
At the preliminary hearing, Carney moved to suppress all
evidence seized from the motor home on the grounds that it was the
product of an unlawful search and seizure. 10 The magistrate denied
Carney's motion." The trial court also denied Carney's motion to
suppress the evidence seized during the warrantless search of the
motor home. 1 2 The California Court of Appeal affirmed,' 3
concluding that the warrantless search of the motor home was
justified under the "automobile exception" to the fourth
amendment warrant requirement. 14 The California Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the motor home was not subject to the
automobile exception and that it should not have been searched
without a warrant.' 5 The United States Supreme Court reversed
the California Supreme Court and held that when a motor home is
being used for transportation, or "is readily capable of such use
and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential
purposes," a warrantless search of the motor home is justified
under the automobile exception. 16 California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct.
2066 (1985).
8. 105 S. Ct. 2067. The agent entered the motor home without a warrant or consent from
Carney. Id.
9. Id. A subsequent warrantless inventory search conducted at the police station revealed
additional marijuana in the cupboards and refrigerator of the motor home. 117 Cal. App. 3d at __,
172 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
10. See 34 Cal. 3d at 603, 668 P.2d at 809, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 502. The State opposed the motion,
arguing that the initial search of the motor home was justified under the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement, and also as a standard "sweep search." Id. at 610, 668 P.2d at 814, 194 Cal.
Rptr. at 507. A sweep search refers to the exception to the warrant requirement that allows the police
to search a premises, after arresting a suspect, to ensure that there are no other people in the
premises who may be a threat to the officer's security. Kelder & Statman, The Protective Sweep Doctrine.
Recurrent Questions Regarding the Propriety of Searches Conducted Contemporaneously with an Arrest on or Near
Private Premises, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 973, 975, 978 (1979). See generally 2 W.

LAFAVE, SEARCH AND

SEIzURE, S6.4(c) (1978 & Supp. 1986) (discussing the protective sweep exception). Additionally, the
State argued that the later warrantless search at the police station was justified as a standard
inventory search. For a discussion of inventory searches, see infra note 39.
11. 34 Cal. 3d at 603, 668 P.2d at 809, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
12. 105 S. Ct. at 2068. The trial court held that there was probable cause to arrest Carney, that
the warrantless search of the motor home was authorized under the automobile exception to the
fourth amendment's warrant requirement, and that the police could seize the motor home itself as
an instrumentality of the crime. Id.
13. 117 Cal. App. 3d at__ , 172 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
14. 105 S. Ct. at 2068.
15. 34 Cal. 3d at 610, 668 P.2d at 814, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 507 (1983). The California Supreme
Court reasoned that motor homes, unlike mere automobiles, are generally designed and used as
temporary or permanent residences. Id. at 606, 668 P.2d at 812, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 505. Therefore,
the court reasoned, the defendant's motor home was entitled to the protections traditionally
applicable to conventional homes. Id. at 609, 668 P.2d at 814, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 507; see Comment,
Californiav. Carney: Fashioninga "Motor Home Exception " to the Warrant Rule, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
216 (1984) (examining the California Supreme Court's decision in Carney and its practical
deficiencies in light of the United States Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence).
16. 105 S. Ct. at 2070. Even though excepted from the warrant requirement, the Court stated
that the fourth amendment still dictates that the search of the motor home must be reasonable. Id. at
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The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the right of "the people" to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 17 An individual is entitled to
fourth amendment protection upon demonstrating, first, that he
had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy in a place, object,
or activity; and second, that the expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable.' In determining whether a search is
reasonable, the United States Supreme Court usually interprets the
fourth amendment to require that, prior to conducting a search or
seizure, law enforcement officers obtain a search warrant from an
impartial and detached judge or magistrate.1 9 The Court generally
enforces the warrant requirement by declaring warrantless searches
and seizures presumptively unreasonable.2 0 The Court, however,
2071. The Court concluded that the search of the motor home was reasonable because the agents had
probable cause to believe that there was evidence of a crime in the vehicle. Id.
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. The language of article I, section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution is virtually identical to that
of the fourth amendment. The section of the North Dakota Constitution provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.

N.D.CONST. art. I, S 8.
18. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In Katz FBI
agents recorded telephone conversations of a Los Angeles bookmaker who transacted business with
out-of-state gamblers over a pay telephone. Id. at 348. Katz was charged and convicted of
transmitting wagering information by telephone. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed Katz' conviction, holding that there had not been a search because there was no physical
invasion of the telephone booth. Id. at 348-49. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," and that the government's actions
violated the privacy that Katz justifiably relied upon while using the telephone booth. Id. at 351-53.
In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan stated as follows:
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognized as "reasonable." Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a
place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes
to the "plain view" of outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to keep
them to himself has been exhibited.
Id. at 361 (Harlan,.1., concurring).
19. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (except for a few specific situations, the fourth amendment requires police to obtain prior judicial approval before conducting a
search); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). In Johnson the Court stated that the warrant
requirement provides protection by insisting that the existence of probable cause, or the
reasonableness of a search, be evaluated by a neutral magistrate rather than by a zealous law
enforcement officer who is personally involved "in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime." Id. at 13-14.
20. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. In Katz the Supreme Court concluded that "searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by ajudge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
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recognizes certain exceptions to the warrant requirement.2 1
The court established the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement over sixty years ago in Carroll v. United States.2 2 In
Carroll the Supreme Court held that, if an officer has probable cause
to believe a motor vehicle contains contraband, he may conduct a
warrantless search of the vehicle. 23 In explaining its decision, the
Court recognized a significant distinction between the search of a
home and the search and seizure of a movable vehicle.2 4 The Court
under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions." Id.
21. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735-36 (1983) (discussing various exceptions to the
warrant requirement). As noted in Brown, the Court has acknowledged the following judicial
exceptions to the warrant requirement: hot pursuit, see, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298
(1967) (warrantless entry and search of a home by police in pursuit of a fleeing felon was reasonable
under the fourth amendment); exigent circumstances, see, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48,
51-52 (1951) (exceptional circumstances may justify a warrantless search and seizure of a hotel
room); automobile search, see, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982) (warrantless
search of an automobile is not unreasonable if supported by probable cause); search of person and
surrounding area incident to an arrest, see, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981)
(warrantless search of defendant's jacket was a valid search incident to a lawful custodial arrest and
did not violate the fourth amendment); search at United States border or "functional equivalent,"
see, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) (power of the federal
government to exclude aliens from the country can be effectuated by routine inspections and searches
at the border or functional equivalent); consent, see, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
219 (1973) (an individual may voluntarily waive his right to privacy under the fourth amendment).
Brown, 460 U.S. at 735-36. In Brown the Court stated that it also recognizes the following "less
severe" intrusions as permissible without a warrant: stop and frisk, see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 30 (1968) (an arresting officer is entitled to conduct a limited weapons search of an arrestee for the
protection of himself and others in the area); seizure for questioning, see, e.g., United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (officers may stop vehicles and detain persons for
questioning without a warrant if the officers have a reasonable suspicion that the vehicles contain
illegal aliens); roadblock, see, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (stopping an
automobile, and detaining its occupants for questioning, is not unreasonable under the fourth
amendment if there is at least an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the law has been violated).
Brown, 460 U.S. at 736. See generally 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE S 7.1-7.5 (1978 & Supp.
1986) (discussing the search and seizure of vehicles and the exceptions regarding them).
22. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll federal prohibition agents unexpectedly encountered the
defendants, suspected "bootleggers," traveling in a vehicle thought to contain intoxicating liquor in
violation of the National Prohibition Act. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 134-36 (1925).
Although the agents had not obtained a warrant they immediately proceeded to conduct a search of
the vehicle at the roadside and discovered 68 bottles of illegal liquor concealed inside the vehicle's
upholstery. Id. The Supreme Court upheld the search, noting that, because of the vehicle's mobility
it was not practicable for the agents to secure a warrant before conducting the search. See id. at 153.
Moreover, the Court concluded that the search was reasonable because the agents had-infbrmation
that would "warrant a man of reasonable caution" to believe that the automobile contained
contraband. Id. at 162.
23. Id. at 149. According to the Carroll doctrine two conditions must exist to justify the
warrantless search of a vehicle. See id. at 153-56. First, an officer must have probable cause to
believe that contraband is located in the vehicle. See id. at 156. Second, there must be exigent
circumstances sufficient to justify dispensing with the warrant requirement. See id. at 153. In
subsequent decisions, the Court has broadened the Carrolldoctrine by allowing reasonable searches
of vehicles even when there is no possibility of the vehicle being moved. See, e.g., Texas v. White,
423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975) (per curiarn' For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 27-33 and
accompanying text..
24. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153. In discussing the distinction between the search of a home and the
search and seizure of a vehicle, the Supreme Court in Carrollstated as follows:
[T~he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth
Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government,
as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or
other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained,
and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods,
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality orjurisdiction in which the warrantmust be sought.
Id. (emphasis added).
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reasoned that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it impracticable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle could move beyond the
25
reach of the officer before the officer is able to obtain a warrant.
In cases subsequent to Carroll, the Supreme Court continued
to reaffirm the mobility theory as a justification for warrantless
searches and seizures of motor vehicles. 26 In Chambers v. Maroney,27
the Court followed the holding of the Carroll decision and
determined that, if police officers have probable cause to believe an
automobile is carrying contraband, the officers may conduct an
immediate roadside search of the automobile before the
opportunity to search is lost.2" The Court further stated that
"[o]nly in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to
probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search. "129
The Court has, however, sustained warrantless searches of
vehicles in cases in which exigent circumstances appear to have
been absent.3 0 In Chambers, which involved the warrantless search
of an impounded vehicle under police control, the Court upheld a
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221 (1968) (because of their
mobility, automobiles may be searched without a warrant upon facts that would not justify a
warrantless search of a residence or office); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967) (warratitless
search of movable automobile may be reasonable although the result might be the opposite in a
search of a home, store, or other fixed piece of property); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364,
366-67 (1964) (what may be an unreasonable search of a home may be reasonable in the case of a
movable automobile); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 164 (1949) (warrantless search of a
vehicle moving on a public highway is valid if probable cause exists for the search); Scher v. United
States, 305 U.S. 251, 253-55 (1938) (officers with probable cause to believe automobile was being
used to transport bootleg liquor were justified in conducting a warrantless search of the vehicle,
notwithstanding vehicle's entry into defendant's garage); Husky v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 701
(1931) (warrantless search of parked automobile by officers with probable cause not unreasonable
because of the car's mobility).
27. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). In Chambers police arrested occupants of a vehicle for armed robbery,
and then drove the car to the police station where they conducted a warrantless search of the auto.
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 44 (1970). The Supreme Court held that the search and seizure
were reasonable because the arrests took place in a dark parking lot late at night and "a careful
search at that point was impracticable and perhaps not safe for the officers." Id. at 52 n.10; see also
Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam). In White the Court upheld the warrantless search
of a car that was stopped in the middle of the day on a main road but was not searched until after it
was removed to the police station. Id. at 67-68. The Court followed Chambers, and concluded that the
probable cause existing when the vehicle was initially stopped still existed after the vehicle was
impounded and in police custody. Id. at 68. Thus, the delayed warrantless search at the stationhouse was permissible. Id. The dissent in White contended that Chambers was not controlling because
there was no showing of a need to impound the car. Id. at 70. According to the dissent "there is no
indication that an immediate search would have been either impracticable or unsafe for the arresting
officers." Id. In Professor LaFave's opinion, White clearly indicates that the Court will uphold a
delayed search of a vehicle whenever, under the same circumstances, it would have upheld a
warrantless roadside search. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 21, S 7.2, at 517.
28. 399 U.S. at 51. The Court in Chambers stated that "Carroll . . . holds a search warrant
unnecessary where there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway; the car
is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant
must be obtained." Id.
29. Id. (emphasis added). The Court observed that because of an automobile's mobility, the
opportunity to search is "fleeting." Id.
30. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973). In Cady the Supreme Court
conceded that warrantless searches of vehicles were upheld "in cases in which the possibilities of the
vehicle's being removed or evidence in it destroyed were remote, if not nonexistent." Id. For a
discussion of Cady, see infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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warrantless search even though the actual threat of mobility had
subsided. 31 Arguably, in such a situation, there is no real exigency
32
and it is no longer impracticable to secure a warrant.
Recently, the Court acknowledged an additional justification
for the motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement: the
diminished expectation of privacy in automobiles."3 The Court has
identified three factors that diminish an individual's expectation of
privacy in an automobile, and thus justify less rigorous adherence
to the warrant requirement. 34 The Court developed the first of
these factors in Cady v. Dombrowski.35 In Cady the Court stated that
the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and the
36
frequency of police-citizen contact involving automobiles,
31. 399 U.S. at 44, 52. In Chambers the occupants of the car were arrested and their car was
taken to the stationhouse where the police conducted a warrantless search. Id. at 44; see also South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). In Opperman the Supreme Court cited Chambers as an
example of one case in which the Court "upheld warrantless searches where no immediate danger
was presented that the car would be removed from the jurisdiction." Id. at 367. For a discussion of
Opperman, see infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
32. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 21, S 7.2, at 514. In Professor LaFave's view, Chambers cannot
be "convincingly rationalized" on the grounds of exigent circumstances. Id.
33. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). In Chadwick, the Court first used the
phrase "diminished expectation of privacy." See id. at 12. For a discussion of Chadwick, see infra note
34. In United States v. Ross Justice Marshall explained the importance of the distinction between
the mobility theory and diminished expectations of privacy in automobiles. United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 830 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In RossJustice Marshall stated as follows:
In many cases . . . the police will, prior to searching the car, have cause to arrest
the occupants and bring them to the station for booking. In this situation, the police
can ordinarily seize the automobile and bring it to the station. Because the vehicle is
now in the exclusive control of the authorities, any subsequent search cannot be
justified by the mobility of the car. Rather, an immediate warrantless search of the
vehicle is permitted because of the second major justification for the automobile
exception: the diminished expectation of privacy in an autmobile.
Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting).
34. For a discussion of the three factors that lead to diminished expectations of privacy in
automobiles, see infra notes 35-47 and accompanying text. In Chadwick v. United States the Court
collectively addressed the factors that reduce an individual's expectation of privacy in an automobile.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977). In Chadwick the Supreme Court held the
warrantless search of a footlocker, which officers had seized from the trunk of the defendant's car,
unreasonable although the police had probable cause to believe that it contained narcotics. Id. at 4,
11. Despite the fact that the footlocker was seized from a mobile vehicle, the Court refused to apply
the automobile exception because "a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are
substantially greater than in an automobile." Id. at 13.
35. 413 U.S. 433 (1973). In Cady police arrested Dombrowski, an off-duty policeman, on a
charge of drunken driving following a one car automobile accident in which Dombrowski's rented
car was severely damaged. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 435-36 (1973). The police had the
car towed to a private garage where a police officer conducted a warrantless search some two and
one-half hours later. Id. at 436-37. The purpose of the search was to locate the revolver that the
arresting officers thought Dombrowski was required to carry. Id. at 437. During the course of the
search, the police discovered blood-stained objects that led to Dombrowski's conviction for murder.
Id. at 437-39. The Court held that the warrantless search was not unreasonable since the police had
lawfully impounded the car. See id. at 447-48. The Court also reasoned that the search for the
revolver was justified by the concern for the safety of the general public who might be endangered if
the weapon fell into the wrong hands. Id. at 447.
36. Id. at 441. The Court explained that police-citizen contact involving motor vehicles occurs if
a police officer believes the operator has violated traffic laws. Id. Therefore, the Court noted, most of
the contact between law enforcement officers and automobiles is noncriminal in nature. Id.
According to the Court, "[I]ocal police officers . . . frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which
there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what . . . may be described as community
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strengthens the constitutional distinction between the search of
homes and similar structures as compared to the search of
vehicles.3 7 The Court reasoned that this extensive regulation
justifies the warrantless search of vehicles even if the exigency of
39
mobility is remote, or nonexistent. 38 In South Dakota v. Opperman
the Court expanded upon this rationale and noted that frequent
police-citizen contact and pervasive governmental regulation of
40
automobiles diminish privacy expectations in motor vehicles.
The second factor that lessens the expectation of privacy in a
motor vehicle is the public nature of automobile travel. 41 In
Cardwell v. Lewis 4 2 the plurality opinion observed that diminished
privacy expectations in a motor vehicle arise because a car is used
for transportation, not as a residence or as a repository of personal
effects, 43 and because a car's occupants and contents travel in plain
view.

44

caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of [criminal]
evidence .... " Id. In South Dakota v. Opperman the Court acknowledged that this frequent contact
between citizens and police contributes to diminished privacy expectations in motor vehicles. South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976). For a discussion of Opperman, see infra notes 3941.
37. 413 U.S. at 442. For a discussion of the constitutional distinction between the search of a
home and the search of a vehicle, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
38. See id. at 441-42. For a discussion of warrantless searches under nonexigent circumstances,
see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
39. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). In Opperman the defendant's automobile was lawfully impounded for
parking violations. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 366 (1976). After impounding the
car, the police conducted a routine inventory search of the automobile. Id. An inventory search refers
to the process in which police search an impounded vehicle for any valuable personal property. See 2
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7.4 (1978) (discussing inventory searches). The purpose of an
inventory search is to protect the vehicle, and property in it, and to protect the police from claims of
lost property. Id. During the inventory search, police discovered marijuana in the unlocked glove
compartment. 428 U.S. at 366. The Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search of the car on the
grounds that the inventory search was a routine, reasonable, and necessary aspect of the police
caretaking function and was carried out in accordance with standard police procedures. Id. at 37576.
40. Id. at 367-68. The Court stated that "lalutomobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to
pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and
licensing requirements." Id. at 368.
41. Id. The Court stated that the "obviously public nature of automobile travel" further
diminishes the expectation of privacy in an automobile. Id. This is not to say, however, that there is
no expectation of privacy in an automobile. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979)
(an individual does not lose all expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its uses are
subject to governmental regulation).
42. 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion). In Cardwell police had arrested the defendant,
towed his car from a public parking lot to a police impoundment lot, and then conducted a
warrantless search of the automobile's exterior. (ardwell v. 'Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 587-88 (1974)
(plurality opinion). A plurality of the Court upheld the search, concluding that the search was based
upon probable cause and was therefore reasonable. Id. at 592-93. Justice Powell concurred with the
plurality decision on the grounds that the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to raise his fourth
amendment claim in state court. Id. at 596 (Powell, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 590. Although the opinion of the plurality implied that repository areas are afforded a
higher degree of constitutional protection than is given to motor vehicles, on numerous occasions the
Court has sustained warrantless searches of enclosed repository areas. See, e.g., United States v.
Johns, 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985) (sealed packages inside a covered pickup truck); United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798 (1982) (package in a car trunk); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (locked car
trunk); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (compartment under the dashboard); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (behind the vehicle's upholstery).
44. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590. In Cardwellthe Court stated as follows:
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is
transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal
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The Court noted the third factor that leads to diminished
privacy expectations in motor vehicles in United States v. Ross. 45 In
Ross the Court stated that the public has always been aware that
motor vehicles may be stopped and searched without a warrant if a
law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle
contains contraband. 46 The Court, in effect, concluded that an
individual's expectation of privacy in a vehicle and its contents
must be balanced against the public's concern for effective law
47
enforcement.
Lower courts have applied the automobile exception to
vehicles other than automobiles. 48 A few courts have specifically
confronted the issue of what protections the fourth amendment
should afford a motor home.4 9 In United States v. Williams 50 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the automobile
exception is inapplicable to a motor home because of the greater
effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.
Id. As the Court stated in Katz, "[wihat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351 (1967).
45. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). In Ross the Supreme Court considered the scope of warrantless
searches permitted under the automobile exception. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800
(1982). The Court described the limits of the search as follows:
[Tihe scope of the warrantless search authorized by . .. [the automobile] exception is
no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by
warrant. If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies
the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of
the search. Id. at 825; see Comment, Search and Seizure - FourthAmendment - The Constitutionally Permissible Scope of
Warrantless Automobile Searches, 59 N.D.L. REv. 97 (1983) (providing an account of the Court's
development of the permissible limits ofa warrantless search under the automobile exception).
46. 456 U.S. at 806 n.8. The Court commented that "if an individual gives the police probable
cause to believe a vehicle is transporting contraband, he loses the right to proceed on his way without
official interference." Id. at 807 n.9.
47. See id. at 823. The Court reasoned that an individual's privacy interests must yield to the
authority of an officer to conduct a search if the officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle is
transporting contraband. Id.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Nigro, 727 F.2d 100, 107 (6th Cir. 1984) (airplanes); United States
v. Weinrich, 586 F.2d 481, 492 (5th Cir. 1978) (boats), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979); United
States v. Miller, 460 F.2d 582, 585-86 (10th Cir. 1972)(self-contained mobile homes).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 740 F.2d 878, 879-80 (lth Cir. 1984) (per curiam);
United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1982); United
States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 865 (1980). The California
Supreme Court characterized the motor home as a "hybrid" which combines "the mobility
attribute of an automobile . . . with most of the privacy characteristics of a house." People v.
Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597, 606, 668 P.2d 807, 812, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500, 505. Because of its hybrid
character, the issue arises concerning whether a motor home is protected by the warrant requirement
of the fourth amendment or whether it falls within the automobile exception. See id. at 601-02, 668
P.2d at 808, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
50. 630 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 865 (1980). In Williams Narcotics Task Force
agents conducted a warrantless search of a motor home after border patrol agents had stopped and
detained the defendant who was suspected of transporting illegal aliens. United States v. Williams,
630 F.2d 1322, 1323-24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 865 (1980). During the course of the search,
agents discovered raw chemicals and other paraphernalia associated with the manufacture of
phencyclidine ("PCP"). Id. at 1323.
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expectations of privacy associated with motor homes. 51 In United
States v. Holland 2 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
also confronted the issue of whether a warrantless search of a motor
home is valid under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement. 3 The court in Holland determined that the
automobile exception applies to motor homes that are being used
solely for transportation purposes and not as dwellings. 54 The
conflicting decisions in Williams and Holland reflect the confusion
55
that exists regarding warrantless vehicle searches.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the automobile exception should be extended to
warrantless searches of motor homes for the firt time in Californiav.
Carney. 56 Prior to reaching the central issue, the Court reaffirmed
the automobile exception first enunciated in Carrolland stated that
the mobility theory 57 and the diminished expectation of privacy in a
motor vehicle5 8 are the two principal justifications for the
59
exception.
The Court in Carney then highlighted some of the factors
60
contributing to reduced privacy expectations in motor vehicles.
The Court cited Cady v. Dombrowski6t as one case in which the
diminished expectation of privacy was sufficient in itself to invoke
62
the automobile exception, despite the immobility of the vehicle.
51. Id. at 1326. The Court reasoned that an individual's expectations of privacy are significantly
greater when traveling in a motor home than when traveling in an ordinary car. Id.; see also United
States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1982). In Wzia a
Ninth Circuit panel reaffirmed the holding in Williams, stating that the automobile exception was
inapplicable to motor homes. Id. The court went on to uphold the warrantless search of a motor
home on the "protective sweep" search incident to arrest doctrine. Id. For an explanation of the
search incident to arrest exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement, see supra note 21.
For a discussion of the protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement, see supra note 10.
52. 740 F.2d 878 (11 th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). In Holland authorities had probable cause to
believe that the defendant's two rented Winnebago motor homes were being used to transport
marijuana. United States v. Holland, 740 F.2d 878, 879 (11 th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). The officers
conducted a warrantless search of the motor homes and discovered approximately 1495 pounds of
marijuana in plain view inside the motor homes. Id.
53. Id. The court determined that the issue of whether a motor home falls within the automobile
exception could not be decided categorically. Id. Instead, the court held that a vehicle's "use,"
rather than its shape or configuration, controlled the application of the automobile exception. Id. at
881.
54. Id. at 880-81.
55. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973). In CadyJustice Rehnquist commented
that the Supreme Court's decisions discussing the constitutionality of warrantless searches of vehicles
"suggest that this branch of the law is something less than a seamless web." Id.
56. 105 S. Ct. 2066(1985).
57. California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2069 (1985). The Court has repeatedly recognized
that the exigencies caused by vehicular mobility are sufficient to authorize a warrantless search and
seizure of an automobile. For a discussion of this theory, see supra notes 22-29 and accompanying
text.
58. 105 S. Ct. at 2069. For a discussion of the diminished expectation of privacy rationale, see
supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
59. 105 S. Ct. at 2069.
60. Id. at 2069-70. For a discussion of the factors that contribute to diminished privacy
expectations in motor vehicles, see supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
61. 413 U.S. 433 (1973). For a discussion of Cady, see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
62. 105 S. Ct. at 2069.

294

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 62:285

Additionally, the Court noted that the configuration of a vehicle
also contributes to reduced privacy expectations, since a vehicle is
relatively open to plain view. 63 The Court observed, however, that
it has applied the automobile exception even when "enclosed
'repository' areas" have been the subject of the search. 64 These
reduced privacy expectations, the Court explained, resulted not
from the fact that the area to be searched was in plain view, but
rather, from the pervasive governmental regulation of motor
vehicles.65

The Court concluded that diminished expectations of privacy,
coupled with the exigencies resulting from a vehicle's ready
mobility, justify warrantless searches of motor vehicles "so long as
the overriding standard of probable cause is met. '"66 Thereafter,
the Court restated the automobile exception to include the motor
home within its application. 67 The Court stated that if a vehicle is
being used for transportation, or if it is readily capable of such use
and is located in a setting not typically used for residential
purposes, then the motor home is subject to the automobile
63. Id. In its analysis of the issue presented in Carney, the California Supreme Court emphasized
the general distinction between the characteristics of a motor home and an automobile. People v.
Carney, 34 Cal. 3d at 608, 668 P.2d at 813, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 506. The court observed as follows:
[Uinlike a car, the interior and contents of an ordinary motor home are not generally
exposed to the public, nor are the occupants, the furnishings or any personal effects in
plain view .... The interior of a motor home is often fully shielded from view by its
design.... Moreover, whatever view exists may be blocked by window coverings such
as shades, curtains, or blinds.
Id.
The United States Supreme Court rejected this analysis and refused to distinguish between a
motor home "either on the public roads and highways, or situated such that it is reasonable to
conclude that the vehicle is not being used as a residence," and an ordinary automobile for the
purposes of the vehicle exception. 105 S. Ct. at 2070. The Court explained that such a distinction
would require it to apply the exception "depending upon the size of the vehicle and the quality of its
appointments." Id. The Court asserted that it would not distinguish between "worthy" and
"unworthy" vehicles in its application of the vehicle exception. Id.; cf. United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 822 (1982) (refusing to distinguish between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers for
purposes of fourth amendment analysis).
64. 105 S. Ct. at 2069. For specific examples of cases in which the Court has upheld warrantless
searches of repository areas, see supra note 43.
65. 105 S. Ct. at 2069. The Court also stated that the public is fully aware that it is afforded less
privacy in vehicles. Id. at 2070. In Ross the Court indicated that this public awareness is a factor that
lessens privacy expectations in motor vehicles. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806 n.8 (1982).
For a discussion of the public awareness factor, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
66. 105 S. Ct. at 2070. In each of the warrantless automobile search cases that have come before
the Supreme Court, the Court has repeatedly stressed the requirement of probable cause. See, e.g.,
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269 (1973) (even under the Carrolldoctrine, there
must be probable cause for a valid search);Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (referring
to the insistence upon probable cause as a minimun requirement for a reasonable search under the
fourth amendment).
67. 105 S. Ct. at 2070. The Supreme Court's holding in Carney appears to invalidate two fairly
recent Ninth Circuit opinions which held that the automobile exception was inapplicable to motor
homes. See United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir.) (greater expectations of privacy
associated with motor homes rendered the automobile exception inapplicable), cert.
denied, 445 U.S.
865 (1980); United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1980) (reaffirming the Williams
decision), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1982).
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exception. 68 The Court acknowledged the "hybrid character" of
the motor home, 69 but explained that the application of the vehicle
exception does not depend upon the possible uses of a vehicle.
Rather, the Court reasoned, the vehicle exception is based upon the
ready mobility of the vehicle, and the presence of the vehicle in a
setting that objectively indicates that it is being used for
transportation.7 0 Thus, Carney requires the presence of two
conditions before a warrantless search of a motor home can be
conducted: first, the motor home must be readily mobile, and
second, the motor home must be used for transportation, not as a
residence.7 1
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, contended that the privacy expectations in a motor home
when "parked in a location that is removed from the public
highway" are similar to the privacy expectations in a fixed
dwelling.72 The dissent concluded that a warrantless search of a
mobile home's interior is " 'presumptively unreasonable absent
exigent circumstances.' "73
In extending the automobile exception to include motor homes
the Court acted consistently with a number of jurisdictions that
68. 105 S. Ct. at 2070. The Court reasoned that the two justifications for the automobile
exception are applicable to the motor home because a motor home is a readily mobile vehicle and is
also subject to extensive regulation and inspection. Id. The Court stated that such regulation is
inapplicable to a fixed dwelling. Id.
69. Id. For the California Supreme Court's comment regarding the motor home's hybrid
character, see supra note 49.
70. 105 S. Ct. at 2070-71; accord United States v. Holland, 740 F.2d 878, 879 (11th Cir. 1984)
(per curiam) (automobile exception applies to a motor home used for transportation purposes). For a
discussion of Holland, see supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
The Court in Carney declined to discuss whether the outcome would be the same if a motor home
was such that an objective observer would have concluded that someone was using it as a residence.
Id. at 2071 n.3. In a footnote, however, the Court listed several factors that could be relevant in
determining whether or not a warrant would be required ifa motor home was used as a residence. Id.
The factors which might be relevant include: "the motor home's] location, whether the vehicle is
readily mobile or instead, for instance, elevated on blocks, whether the vehicle is licensed, whether it
is connected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access to a public road." Id.
71. 105 S. Ct. at 2070-71. Justice Stevens stated in dissent that [w]arrantless searches
of motor
homes are only reasonable when the motor home is traveling on the public streets or highways, or
when exigent circumstances otherwise require an immediate search without the expenditure of time
necessary to obtain a warrai.." Id. at 2075 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Justice Stevens, a motor home "may not be a
castle," but it "is usually the functional equivalent of a hotel room, a vacation and retirement home,
or a hunting and fishing cabin." Id. at 2078 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2078 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct.3296, 3303
(1984)). Justice Stevens also argued that the Court prematurely resolved the issue in Carney. Id. at
2073 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated as follows:
Despite the age of the automobile exception and the countless cases in which it has
been applied, we have no prior cases defining the contours of a reasonable search in
the context of hybrids such as motor homes, house trailers, houseboats or yachts. In
this case, the Court can barely glimpse the diverse lifestyles associated with
recreational vehicles and mobile living quarters.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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have considered the issue. 7 4 It is questionable, however, whether
the Court in Carney succeeded in articulating a clear standard to
guide law enforcement officers attempting to determine whether or
not to search a motor home. The majority suggested that a search
warrant must be secured whenever an objective observer would
conclude that a motor home was being used as a residence, not as a
vehicle.7 5 The majority holding appears rather vague, however,
because motor home owners typically use their motor home for
both residential and transportation purposes. 7 6 The decision may
pose difficulties for police officers who, prior to initiating a search,
must determine whether a motor home is being used as a residence
or as a vehicle. 7 7
In prior cases, the Supreme Court stated that the basic
purpose of the fourth amendment is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary and unreasonable police
intrusions.7 8 The majority in Carney stated that its holding achieved
a proper balance between the legitimate privacy interests at stake in
the warrantless search of a motor home and the societal concern for
unhampered law enforcement. 7 9 Although it is difficult to predict
the implications of California v. Carney, the Court's holding does
expand a law enforcement officer's authority to conduct
warrantless searches of motor vehicles. 8 0
74. The following jurisdictions have also applied the automobile exception to motor homes and
camper vans: Florida (see State v. Francoeur, 387 So. 2d 1063, 1064-65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(search of vehicle was justified under the automobile exception despite the fact that the vehicle was
generally described as a " 'mobile homes,' 'camper homes,' or 'van' ")); Maine (see State v. Mower,
407 A.2d 729, 731-32 (Me. 1979) (search of converted school bus/camper was reasonable under the
automobile exception despite the fact that the defendant used the vehicle as his home)); Minnesota
(see State v. Lepley, 343 N.W.2d 41, 42 (Minn. 1984) (motor homes and similar vehicles used as
motor vehicles fall within the scope of the vehicle exception)).
75. See 105 S. Ct. at 2070.
76. Cf United States v. Cadena, 588 F.2d 100, 102 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (increased
privacy interests in ships designed for use as residences "mandates careful scrutiny both of probable
cause for the search and the exigency of the circumstances excusing the failure to secure a warrant"),
aff'gon rehearing585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978).
77. See Comment, California v. Carney: Fashioninga "Motor Home Exception " to the Warrant Rule,
60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 216, 232 (1984). The commentator notes that police will often have
problems in determining the apparent use of a particular motor home, and states as follows:
Rarely will the clear Carroll-Chambersscenarios present themselves. More likely, a
motor home's "use" will combine both residential and transportation purposes.
Then, the question arises how police officers, "engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime," are to balance their own law enforcement needs
against the privacy expectations of individuals.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
78. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) ("basic purpose of [the
fourth amendment] . . . is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by governmental officials").
79. 105 S. Ct. at 2071.
80. In the view of one commentator, Carney is not a major decision but "is symptomatic of the
Court's recent activity in dispensing with the procedural requirement of search and arrest warrants
based on probable cause." Stewart, On the RoadAgain: The VehicularFourthAmendment, A.B.A.J.,July
1985, 106, 108 (providing a succinct analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Carney).
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North Dakota will likely follow the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Carney. 8 1 North Dakota's constitutional search
and seizure provision is nearly identical to that of the United States
Constitution. 82 The North Dakota Supreme Court has adopted the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement 3 and has endorsed the Supreme Court's two justifications for the automobile
exception: mobility and the lesser privacy expectation concerning
vehicles.8 4 Further, although the North Dakota Supreme Court has
acknowledged its power to apply higher constitutional standards to
the state constitution than are mandated by decisions of the United
5
States Supreme Court interpreting the Federal Constitution, it
has not yet done so in any case involving the warrantless search of a
motor vehicle. 8 6 Therefore, in all likelihood, the North Dakota
Supreme Court will adhere to the holding in Carney.

SYLVIA

N.

STEENSON-KLOSTER

81. See State v. Matthews, 216 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1974). In his concurrence in Matthews, Chief
Justice Erickstad acknowledged the court's obligation to adhere to the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court: "Our obligation to apply constitutional law as the majority of the United States
Supreme Court has stated it applies to all United States constitutional issues." Id. at 105 (Erickstad,
C.J., concurring specially).
82. See N.D. CONsT. art. I, S 8. For the text of article I, section 8, of the North Dakota
Constitution, see supra note 17.
83. See, e.g., State v. Binns, 194 N.W.2d 756, 759 (N.D. 1972) (warrantless search of
automobile is valid if officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband).
84. See State v. Meadows, 260 N.W.2d 328, 332 (N.D. 1977) (warrantless searches of vehicles
are justified because of the inherent mobility of automobiles and the lesser expectation of privacy
regarding them).
85. Matthews, 216 N.W.2d at 99. In Matthews the court stated that [i]t is within the power of this
court to apply higher constitutional standards than are required of the States by the Federal
Constitution." Id.
86. See, e.g., State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465 (N.D. 1982) (applying principles set forth
by the Supreme Court and concluding that, for a valid warrantless search of a vehicle, searching
officer must have probable cause to believe the automobile contains contraband, and the search must
be of limited scope); State v. Meadows, 260 N.W.2d 328, 332 (N.D. 1977) (following the Supreme
Court's analysis in concluding that the warrantless search of a vehicle is justified by the inherent
mobility of automobiles and the lesser expectations of privacy regarding them). But cf State v.
Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363, 372 n.5 (N.D. 1985) (noting that the court was intimating no view as
to whether "we should chart an independent course under Article I, Section 8, of the North Dakota
Constitution with regard to the 'good-faith' exception" to the warrant requirement which the United
States Supreme Court adopted in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)).

